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REGULATION OF Bus1NEss-BmaNG AND THEATER Now WITHIN ScoPE
OF THE SHERMAN AcT-The United States instituted two civil antitrust
actions under section 4 of the Sherman Act1 claiming that defendants
were acting in restraint of trade in their respective fields. Defendant
Shubert was engaged in the multistate business of producing, booking,
and presenting legitimate theatrical attractions. Defendant International
Boxing Club was engaged in the business of promoting professional boxing contests, also on a multistate basis, with an alleged 25 percent of its
revenue being derived from the interstate sale of radio, television, and
motion picture rights. The district court dismissed both complaints on

126 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4.

1955]

RECENT DECISIONS

147

the authority of Federal Baseball Club v. National League2 and Toolson v.
New York Yankees, lnc.,3 which had held that the business of professional
baseball was not interstate trade or commerce within sections I and 2 of
the Sherman Act.4 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed,
with two justices dissenting in the I.B.C. case. Both activities constitute
interstate trade or commerce under the Sherman Act. The baseball cases
apply only to that sport and afford no basis for a conclusion that all
businesses built around live performances of local exhibitions are exempt
from the antitrust laws. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 75 S.Ct.
277 (1955); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 75
S.Ct. 259 (1955).
To prosecute a federal antitrust action successfully under the Sherman
Act, the complainant must show the violation to be "in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states."5 Although the Federal Baseball
decision narrowly construed the scope of these requirements, trade or
commerce is not limited to the exchange or production of commodities, 6
but includes businesses providing only services.7 In addition, the activity
will be within the scope of the act if it is an inseparable part of a con-'
tinuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states8 or has
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.9 In the Shubert
case the integration of producing, booking, and presenting stage productions across the nation clearly meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
Sherman Act.10 Despite defendant's claim that the baseball cases were
decisive authority, the Court decided that in light of earlier theatrical
cases11 and in the absence of unique factors present in the Toolson case,
the theater business should not come within the exemption granted to
baseball.

2 259

U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465 (1922).
346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78 (1953).
26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 and 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465 (1922); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940). Eckler, "Baseball-Sport or Commerce," 17 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 56 (1949).
7 United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 70 S.Ct. 711
(1950); American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 63 S. Ct. 326 (1943);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S.Ct. 254 (1944).
s Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S.Ct. 276 (1905); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944).
9 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942); Mandeville Island Farms
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct. 996 (1948).
10 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
11 In Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 43 S.Ct. 540 (1923),
a conspiracy to control the booking and presentation of vaudeville acts was alleged.
The same court that decided the Federal Baseball case held that the incidental interstate aspects of any activity may become of sufficient magnitude to place it within the
Sherman Act. See also Ring v. Spina, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 647, mod. (2d Cir.
1951) 186 F. (2d) 637, cert. den. 341 U.S. 935, 71 S.Ct. 854 (1951) (theater productions
within the Sherman Act). In San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F.
3
4
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In the I.B.C. case the Court did not hold that boxing itself was
interstate trade. But the promotional undertakings of the defendant,
especially the large percentage of gross receipts it derived from the sale
of radio, television, and motion picture rights, did serve to bring it within
the scope of the Sherman Act.12 Though by analogy to the baseball cases,
it would seem that boxing should also be exempt, the Court refused to
extend the exemption since (1) there had been no previous case specifically
exempting boxing; 13 (2) boxing, unlike baseball, had not built up a vast
organization in reliance on the Federal Baseball decision; 14 (3) there was
an apparent desire by Congress to immunize certain aspects of baseball
from the Sherman Act, but a contrary expression as to the promotional
aspects of organized sports,15 with the final legal distinction between baseball and other sports being left to the courts.16 The Toolson case was concerned only with the "reserve clause" system, which is admittedly necessary
for the preservation of organized baseball and other team sports.17 Thus,
the I.B.C. case presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to
pass on restraints in a non-team sport as well as the promotional features
of organized athletics.18 While team sports, depending upon limited
league competition, have a need for a monopoly of player talent, nonteam sports such as boxing do not have this need and can be promoted
equally well on an independent competitive basis.19 In light of Congress'
recommendations and the I.B.C. holding, it is probable that promotional
restraints of any sport, including baseball, will be subject to the Sherman
Act even though the language of the baseball cases is sufficiently broad to
exclude all of its activities.
(2d) 310, Ring v. Spina, supra, was distinguished and an individual performer was held
not to be within interstate commerce.
12 This conclusion approves recent lower court decisions holding that the sale
of such rights is sufficient to place a sport within the antitrust laws. In Gardella v.
Chandler, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 402, the district court's dismissal was reversed
on the theory that the sale of radio and television rights may bring baseball within
the Sherman Act. Subsequently, at the request of the Justice Department, baseball
rescinded its restrictive agreements in this area. H. Hearing on H.R. 2002, 82d Cong.,
1st sess., part VI, pp. 1177-1179 (1951). In United States v. National Football League,
(D.C. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 319, football's restrictions on the sale of radio and television rights were considered within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. See 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 466 (1953).
13 Shall v. Henry, (7th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 226, which did exempt boxing, was
decided after the district court's dismissal of the IBC case.
14 But see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., note 9 supra; Neville,
"Baseball and the Antitrust Laws," 16 FORDHAM L. REv. 208 (1947); REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-TRusr LAws 62-63 (1955).
15 H. Rep. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 230 (1952).
16 Id. at pp. 134-136, 231-232.
17 Id. at p. 228. See also 53 CoL. L. REv. 242 (1953).
18 Although the Court in the principal cases limited the Toolson case to baseball,
it is likely that the lower courts will use its authority to immunize the reserve clause
agreements of other professional. team sports.
19 See 62 YALE L. J. 576 at 630 (1953).
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By applying the distinction that restraints which are necessary for the
preservation of team sports are beyond the scope of the Sherman Act,
the courts in effect decide the merits in order to determine the issue
of jurisdiction. A more logical alternative would be to include professional
organized sports within interstate commerce and then determine liability
through application of the rule of reason.20 But because of the possibility
that some of the necessary restraints may be found to be unreasonable
per se,21 thereby causing a breakdown of organized baseball,22 it may be
best to maintain the status quo. It is unlikely that Congress will advocate
a change if the Supreme Court continues its present trend of deciding the
merits of the case at the jurisdictional stage and shielding necessary monopolistic practices in baseball and other team sports from the operations
of the Sherman Act.
Norman A. Zilber, S.Ed.

20 See Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation," 50
(1952), and cases cited therein.
21 Id. at 1150.
22 See 53 COL. L. REV. 242 (1953).
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